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Re-creating the Past: The
Manipulation of the Notion of
Rupture in Egyptian Revolutions
Giedre Sabaseviciute
1 In March 2009, members of two Egyptian parties, the New Wafd and the Nasserist Party,
clashed  at a  conference  held  to  commemorate  the  90th anniversary  of  the  Egyptian
revolution of 1919. The conference was meant to discuss its relation to another Egyptian
revolution, known as the July revolution of 1952. While the Nasserist Party – the heir of
the July revolution – criticized the 1919 revolution for its supposedly bourgeois character,
the New  Wafd  party  –  which  claimed  the  legacy  of  1919  –  asserted  that  the  1952
revolution was led by a handful of officers and resembled more a military coup than a
genuine popular revolution. Rather than reconciling the two revolutions, the conference
ended up with several senior Wafd members walking out in protest.
2 This debate reflects a long lasting historical rivalry between two main social upheavals,
commonly referred to as “revolutions”, which occurred in the 20th century Egypt. In 1919,
hoping to curb the rising national movement in Egypt, the British authorities, de facto
rulers of the country since its occupation in 1882,  arrested and exiled leaders of the
Egyptian Delegation (al Wafd al Misri) which was formed to negotiate Egypt’s independence
at the Versailles conference. The arrest of Sa’ad Zaghlul a popular national leader sparked
an uprising in March-April 1919. The uprising sporadically continued until 1922 and was
beset with the acts of civil disobedience, demonstrations, massive strikes and riots. In
1922, Egypt was granted partial independence and a year later, in 1923, a constitution. A
few decades later, in July 1952, a group of young army officers known as the Free Officers
Movement led a military coup which resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the
ending of British occupation in 1956. Contemporary tensions between the New Wafd and
Nasserists  as  illustrated in  the  cited example  derive  precisely  from these  conflicting
interpretations of Egyptian past and history, in particular, the problem of where to place
its historical rupture, in 1919 or 1952.
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3 In this paper, I discuss the different strategies employed in marking the revolutionary
rupture at two moments of  political  change,  between 1919 and 1923 and in 1952.  By
analyzing historiographical literature produced in the aftermath of each moment, I seek
to demonstrate how a revolutionary rupture can be denied, replaced or reinstated by
subsequent revolutions in order to reaffirm its own revolutionary character. In order to
have a complete picture of Egyptian revolutions, I include the account of what came to be
considered as the first national revolution – the revolt led by Ahmad Urabi in 1881-1882,
which was first marginalized then rehabilitated by the July revolution of 19521.
4 Given the fact that, in the national historiography produced after 1952 the very notion of
revolution  seems  to  be  synonymous  with  that  of  rupture,  I  will  draw  a  particular
attention to the use of the term of “revolution” (al thawra) and the transformations of its
meaning. Far from trying to answer the question of whether these moments of political
change were genuine revolutions that induced an objective rupture, I seek to replace the
question on the level of perceptions : why and when these moments of political change
came to be perceived as “revolutions”?
5 Does  historiography  provide  adequate  sources  for  analyzing  the  perceptions  of
revolutionary ruptures? In an extremely well-documented study on the formation and
evolution of the Egyptian historiography, The Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and
History  Writing  in  Twentieth-Century  Egypt (2009),  Yoav  Di  Capua  convincingly
demonstrated that the formation of modern history was intimately linked with the birth
of the idea of nation as “Egypt was forged as an ultimate subject of historic inquiry”2. The
conviction  that  only history  can  provide  answers  how  to  achieve  modern  Egyptian
nationhood acted as a guiding thread for the Egyptian historical project. As a result, it
was history that was used as the main basis for instituting various competing projects of
modernity. The desire for change, understood as the transition from the actual state of
affairs to the imagined and constantly redefined modern nationhood accompanied Egypt
throughout the entire 20th century. Couched by the first reformist intellectuals in the idea
of “there is no nation under tyranny”, the belief in revolutionary action was maintained
as the means to create a modern nation. Because of the interconnected character between
nation,  revolution  and history,  Egyptian  historiography well  reflects  the  perceptions
concerning the evolution of Egyptian history and its ruptures.
 
Ahmad Urabi's movement: revolution or revolt?
6 Referred as “the first Egyptian revolution” several decades later, the movement led by
the Colonel Ahmad Urabi is deemed to be the first expression of a truly Egyptian national
consciousness.  The Urabi  movement  initially  started as  a  protest  against  poor  socio-
economic conditions of the army and discriminatory practices of the Turco-Circassian
military elite against “native-born” Egyptian soldiers. Influenced by the ideas of political
reform that  were circulating through political  clubs and Masonic lodges attended by
intellectual, military and political elites, the officers added a constitutional program to
their demands. As a result, some intellectuals joined the movement. The majority of them
were  Syrian Christians,  who played a  crucial  role  in  the  literary  movement  of  Arab
culture revival, known as Nahda, and in the formation of a new political culture of protest
in Egypt3.
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7 The Urabist movement succeeded first in having a Circassian minister of war replaced by
their own candidate and then, in forcing the ruler, Khedive Tawfik, to appoint a new head
of the cabinet, Sharif Pacha, who was charged to draft a constitution and to convoke the
Chamber  of  delegates.  However,  a  confrontation  between the  newly  elected  cabinet,
backed by Khedive, British and French councils, and the Chamber, supported by officers,
soon arose over the control of country’s budget. As a result, fissures erupted between
Egyptian  and  Syrian  intellectuals  and  the  latter  group  defected  from Urabist  cause.
Growing  Urabists’  recourse  to  Egyptian  nationalist  rhetoric  nourishing  anti-foreign
sentiment has probably alienated Syrian intellectuals who, as subjects of the Ottoman
Empire,  advocated pro-Ottomanist  ideas  and were  naturally  opposed to  any signs  of
Egyptian territorial nationalism. Mounting sectarian tensions culminated in a bloody riot
in Alexandria in July 1882, followed by the British bombardment of the city and military
occupation of the country.
8 The relevance of the Urabi movement to our point is twofold. Primarily, the account of
the movement recorded by intellectuals in their journals and history books informs us
how the event was perceived in its aftermath and helps us to grasp the shift of its future
historiographical  representation.  Secondly,  given  the  popularity  of  the  idea  of
constitutional reform at the end of 19th century and the fact that Urabi’s movement was
partly motivated by constitutional demands, it is relevant to ask whether the event was
considered as a revolution by intellectuals who supported it.
9 In  the  second half  of  19th century,  the  debate  on the  reform (al  Islah)  occupied the
foremost place in the Ottoman intellectual circles. The reform was seen as a necessary
means to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and rescue it from its supposed decline vis-à-vis
the flourishing West. Ottoman intellectuals borrowed its ideological content of the French
Revolution, considering it as a universal movement which, having originated in the West,
was inevitably spreading all over the world to bring about the rule of law, natural rights
and individual liberties. Significant in this respect was Adib Ishaq, a Syrian intellectual
who settled in Egypt in 1881. He described reform as a flame, which was first lit in the
French  Revolution  and  then  spread  to  north  to  Germany  and  to  Russia,  where  it
respectively took the forms of socialism and nihilism. The flame also reached the East
inspiring the movement of Babism in Persia, leading to the deposition of Sultan Abdul
Aziz in Istanbul followed by the adoption of the Ottoman constitution in 18764. In general,
the reform was defined as  an inevitable  culmination of  history characterized by the
adoption of the constitution and the end of absolutist rule. Was the Urabi movement
perceived as an integral part of this universal movement of the reform, similar to that
which was underway in the Ottoman Empire?
10 Though Urabi revolt was not so much linked to such a movement of reform as Ottoman
movement was, the articles written in support of the constitutional government in Egypt
and directed against the despotism of the authority suggest that Urabi movement was
considered,  at  least  before the fall  of  Sharif  pasha’s  government,  as  a rupture and a
revolution.  Its  revolutionary  character  was  in  particular  advocated  by  the  “native”
Egyptian intellectuals, the most virulent among which were Abdullah Nadim and Ya'qub
Sannu. They widely popularized the Urabist cause within Egyptian masses by writing in
colloquial  Egyptian  instead  of  classical  Arabic  which  was  not  accessible  to  illiterate
Egyptians5. For instance, Abdullah Nadim perceived the Urabi’s movement as a rupture
between the new and old eras. He subsequently changed the name of his journal from
Tankit wa Tabkit into al Taef which was to became the official organ of Urabists6. On his
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behalf, in his satirical journal Abu Naddara al Zarqa published in Paris, Ya’qub Sannu called
the movement “Egyptian Revolution” and considered it of his own making7.
11 The case of Ottomanist intellectuals was different. While speaking about the reform, their
eyes were primarily turned to the Ottoman Empire where the constitution had just been
suspended in 1878, only two years after its adoption in 1876. Thus most probably they
viewed the Urabi movement as a part of the greater Ottoman reform. Given the fact that
their  idea  of  revolution  was  intimately  linked  to  their  nationalist  consciousness,
Ottomanist  intellectuals  could  not  view  the  events  in  Egypt  as  being  some  kind  of
exclusively Egyptian revolution. This is the reason why these intellectuals, after a short-
lasting appreciation of  Urabi  movement,  withdrew their  support  when its  nationalist
undertones became too loud.
12 Unsurprisingly,  the  account  of  the  Urabi  revolt  left  by  intellectuals  in  their  private
newspapers  and  history  books  was  predominately  negative.  We  can  observe  two
prevailing tendencies. First of them, promoted mostly by Ottomanist intellectuals, was a
tendency  to  separate  Urabi  movement  from  its  constitutional  demands  and  to  put
emphasis on its final and violent stage. This view was supported by intellectuals who
tended  to  explain  the  failure  of  Urabists  in  terms  of  Egyptian  immaturity  for
constitutional  government.  The account of  Syrian intellectual  Gurgi  Zaydan on Urabi
movement is representative of this view8. The second tendency was mostly espoused by
the  young  generation  of  Egyptian  nationalists  who  blamed Ahmad  Urabi  for  having
caused British occupation9.
13 The question of whether the Urabi movement was perceived as the revolution is further
complicated by the ambiguity of the Arabic term for revolution, thawra. The term thawra 
does not correspond exactly to the revolution. In its classical usage, the word thawra meant
“stirring up” or “arousing” and etymologically has hardly anything to do with the term
revolution which derives from Latin “revolvere” and was originally applied to express the
action by a celestial body of going round in an orbit or elliptical course. Thus while thawra
means the ongoing insurrection or revolt  seeking for the change,  the term revolution
implies that the change has already taken place. Tellingly, the term thawra was not used
to designate the universal movement of change described by Adib Ishaq. In the Ottoman
context, intellectuals seem to have preferred the concept reform (islah) while reserving
the term thawra mostly to the European revolutions, the foremost among which was the
French Revolution. Such a cautious use of this term is probably linked to the violent
dimension that the concept implied and the fact that intellectuals recommended to avoid
violence in seeking for political change. Their reluctance to call for revolutionary change
is logical given the fact that the majority of intellectuals were still  patronized by the
rulers. In addition, in 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries, the term thawra carried
negative meanings, associated either to sectarian riots or secessionist movements from
Ottoman Empire,  such as  those which were underway in Ottoman Balkan province10.
Unsurprisingly, if the term thawra was used to designate Urabi’s movement, it was done
mostly by intellectuals who emphasized the violent stage of the movement, as Salim al
Naqqash11 and Gurgi Zaydan. It is important,  however, to mention that Urabi himself
called his movement thawra in his memoirs, written in 1882, and intended to clear his
name of charges of  mutiny.  The title of  the memoirs,  Unveiling the Secrets  of  Egyptian
Awakening (al nahda), Known as Urabi Revolution indicates that the term was widely used to
designate  Urabi  movement.  Nevertheless,  the  positive  term nahda (awakening)  most
likely was kept to overshadow the negative concept of thawra.
Re-creating the Past: The Manipulation of the Notion of Rupture in Egyptian R...
La Révolution française , Rupture(s) en Révolution
4
 1919 revolution: the undefined rupture
14 The main task of this section is to find out whether the 1919 revolution was perceived as
the event having generated a historical rupture. By 1919 revolution, I mean here a set of
events  ranging from the formation of  the Egyptian delegation (al  Wafd)  in  1918,  the
popular uprising in 1919, partial independence in 1922 and adoption of the constitution
in 1923. My second task is to determine which of these moments was chosen as rupture in
Egyptian national history.
15 In historiographical literature produced between 1920 and 1946, two major tendencies
seem to prevail: an almost complete lack of interest in both the Urabi’s movement and
1919 uprising and a tendency to focus on the actions of the Wafd and its leader Sa’ad
Zaghlul. With one exception which will be treated later, not a single book was explicitly
devoted to 1919 revolution under this period. Historical books on the revolution start to
appear  only  after  the  World  War  II  with  the  publication  of  In  the  Aftermath  of  1919
Revolution in 1946 by a nationalist historian Abdul Rahman al Rafii. Interestingly enough,
the majority of historical studies produced after 1919, focused on the history of royal
dynasty in the period stemming from the French expedition in 1798 until  the British
occupation in 1882. Such a restriction of the subject matters of history was contingent on
the genesis of historical science itself. As already mentioned, the formation of history in
Egypt was inextricably linked to the birth of the idea of modern nation. Thus, the search
of roots and formation of the Egyptian nation at the end of 19th century was of primordial
importance to those historians who, consequently, did not devote any historical attention
to the uprising of  1919.  A tight  censorship imposed by the monarchy in  attempt  to
preserve  the  dynasty’s  historical  image  played  certainly  a  role  in  the  restriction  of
subjects of history. At the same time censorship alone can not account for the absence of
historical  works  on  the  uprising  of  1919.  Some historians  adventured  themselves  in
writing the national history that contested the royal history and the repressive means,
such as book banning or denying access to the archives, did not seem to discourage them
12. Moreover, in Egypt until present day censorship is usually enforced by intellectuals
themselves employed as censors. Thus, it seems that the restriction of subjects of history
was dictated rather by the lack of interest in recent events which was shared by the
Egyptian intellectual community.
16 The first history book of a nationalist historian Abd al Rahman al Rafii entitled Patriotic
Societies. A History of Nationalist Awakenings and published in 1922 gives insight into his
perception of Egyptian events. Though the book is devoted to foreign, mostly Western
revolutions, in its introduction the author presents the state of the national struggle in
Egypt. Without mentioning the 1919 uprising or the formation of the Wafd, al Rafii places
some kind of rupture on the World War I considering it as the beginning of “a new stage
of history characterized by the freedom of nations and their right to self-determination”.
The national struggle is considered as still in its beginnings, but the victory is viewed as
inevitable because it  is  determined by the course of History.  By stressing the role of
patriotic societies in organizing the national struggle, al Rafii “forgets” the 1919 uprising
and hints that it was the war that marked the rupture between the past, characterized by
the “stagnation of nations”, and the present, perceived as something to move through
into the future. The book Egyptian Question and the Wafd written by a contemporary of the
revolution Mahmoud Abu al Fath in 1922 presents a similar case. The author extensively
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narrates the adventures of the Wafd in its bargaining for independence from 1918 till
1921, but does not devote a single line to the uprising of 1919. Similarly, of 14 lines given
to the 1919 uprising in a biography of Sa’ad Zaghlul by Muhammad al Buhayri ‘Ibraat al
Sharq (1927), six are devoted to human losses, while the event is called both a “movement
of disobedience” (harakat al-‘isyan) and thawra.
17 The  first  tentative  to  rehabilitate  the  1919  revolution  was  made  by  the  renowned
Egyptian writer Tawfiq al Hakim. In his famous novel The Return of the Spirit written in
1933 he dedicated last two chapters to the 1919 revolution which was portrayed as a
national force stemming from the people that unexpectedly came into the surface. Abbas
al Aqqad, another famous Egyptian poet, as well viewed the 1919 revolution under the
positive light in his biography of Sa’ad Zaghlul in 1936. However, the fact that the biggest
part of the account is devoted to the justification of violent incidents that took place
during the revolt suggests that the prestige of the 1919 events was rather at low ebb13.
Such  a  negative  assessment  of  the  1919  uprising  prevailing  at  that  time  could  be
explained by the general  distrust  of  “masses”,  considered as  naturally irrational  and
violent. A revolution, understood as a mode of change led by the “masses” was strictly
disapproved  by  intellectuals.  Nevertheless,  cognizant  of  the  need  of  change  and
influenced  by  echoes  of  the  French  Revolution,  some intellectuals  accepted  the
revolutionary idea but only if it was orchestrated by the elites from above, thus, equating
the notion of the revolution to that of the reform14. Considered from this point of view,
Aqqad’s portrayal of the 1919 revolution as the event that took Sa’ad Zaghlul by surprise
was the first  attempt to separate the 1919 uprising from the elites  while giving it  a
positive assessment, and as such, it was highly innovative.
18 In brief,  the rupture was marked either in the formation of the Wafd in 1918 or the
institution of the parliamentary life or the adoption of the constitution in 1923 while the
1919 uprising was not considered as the event worth of historical inquiry. Naturally, it was
these moments that were made into national holidays in pre-1952 Egypt.  The 13th of
November was commemorated as the National Struggle day to mark the day in 1918 when
Sa’ad  Zaghlul  asked  for  Egyptian  independence.  Similarly,  the  adoption  of  the
constitution was celebrated on the 19th of April.  The revolution of 1952 will  abrogate
these national anniversaries and will place the historical rupture on the uprising of 1919.
19 To this overall picture of historical representation of 1919, there is a curious exception
which should be viewed as a particular case: it is Muhammad Sabry’s book entitled La
Révolution Egyptienne written as his doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne University in
1922. Sabry was the first historian who chose the 1919 uprising as the main subject of
history.  In  order  to  explain this  innovative  vision  born  at  the  time  when  Egyptian
historiographical field was dominated either by a royal or Wafd-centered history, two
complementary arguments could be proposed.  First of all,  Sabry’s doctoral study was
realized under the supervision of François Aulard,  official  republican historian of the
French revolution. Sabry’s book was intended to celebrate the birth of Egyptian republic
through the  revolution,  following the  example  of  the  French Revolution15.  Thus,  the
vision of the 1919 uprising as “la fille de la Révolution Française” should be read in the
context of republican intellectual environment that Aulard and his colleagues created.
The parallels drawn by Sabry between the French Revolution and the uprising of 1919
were  certainly  influenced,  if  not  determined,  by  the  official  ideology  of  the  French
Revolution implying that the French revolutionary experience would inevitably spread
and repeat itself in the international area. Secondly, while considering Sabry’s work, we
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should bear in mind that at that time the Wafd was still in process of negotiation for
Egyptian independence.  In  doing so,  the delegation heavily  relied on its  propaganda
activities intended to the French intellectual and political community, which, as the main
rival of Great Britain in the world-wide colonial contest showed itself more receptive to
the idea of Egyptian independence. As a secretary of the Wafd in Paris, Sabry could have
written  the  book  in  order  to  garner  French  intellectuals’  support  for  the  Egyptian
independence16. However that may be, his book might have never been translated into
Arabic and his readership in Egypt might have been limited. In 1927 Sabry published a
history book in Arabic in which, following the fashion of other Egyptian historians of that
time, he stopped his historical account with the period of the World War I while reserving
to the 1919 uprising not more than last two pages…
 
1952 revolution: culmination of the revolutionary spirit
20 After World War II, the historical representation of Egyptian past began to shift. First of
all, we observe a growing interest to the Urabi revolt and the uprising of 1919, both of
which increasingly  are  considered as  revolutions  and not  as  mere  revolts.  But  their
historical assessment was different. While the Urabi revolt was portrayed in a positive
light  as  the  first  genuine  national  and  popular  revolution,  the  1919  revolution  was
increasingly viewed as a partial success if not a total failure. Precisely, its flaws were
attributed to the Wafd and Sa’ad Zaghlul’s leadership while its partial success was placed
on the Wafd main rivals’ merit, the National Party led by Mustapha Kamel.
21 The first book devoted to the 1919 uprising was published by a prolific historian and a
former member of the National Party, Abd al Rahmad al Rafii in 1946 under the title of
The Revolution of 1919. The National Egyptian History 1914-1921. The whole book could be read
as an attempt to evaluate whether the revolution was a success or failure and it concludes
with the idea that it  was “a partial  success”.  A year later al  Rafii  published the first
volume  of  the  second  book  on  the  subject,  named  In  the  Aftermath  of  the  Egyptian
Revolution: the Revolution of 1919, in which he devoted a whole chapter to “the faults of
Sa’ad Zaghlul”. In 1949, he published the second edition of the book on Urabi revolt (the
Urabi Revolution and British Occupation), first edited in 1937, and in its introduction he tied
the revolt into a greater historical sequence of Egyptian revolutions, a dimension that
was absent in the first edition. Moreover, contrary to the introduction of 1937’s edition,
he did not evoke “the errors of its leadership” leaving a generally positive assessment of
Urabi revolt.
22 If Rafii’s views on the 1919 revolution and Sa’ad Zaghlul could be attributed to his loyalty
to the Nationalist Party which still competed with the Wafd for the domination in the
nationalist  narrative,  he  was  by  no  means  the  sole  historian  who  promoted  such  a
historical  vision.  In  a  study  published  in  1946  under  the  tile  of  The  Socialist  Order.
Exposition, Analysis and Critics, two scholars, Ahmad Abd al Hamid and Rashid al Barawi,
presented a similar vision. According to it, one class, the bourgeoisie, appropriated the
national event for its aims and benefits and once they were achieved, it discarded the
majority of the people leaving them to poverty, ignorance and unemployment. As for
Urabi’s revolt, a groundbreaking study was produced in 1947 by Mahmoud Khafif, entitled
Ahmad Urabi, the Distorted Leader. By seeking to “correct a distorted image” of Urabi and to
clear him from all faults, the author proposed that his revolution should be placed on the
same level as the French, American and English revolutions. Moreover, he suggested that
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the date of the military demonstration in Abdin palace that started the Urabi’s movement
should  be  celebrated  in  the  manner  of  the  14th of  July  of  the  French Revolution.  A
bourgeoning Marxist historian school promoted a similar representation. In a book that
could be considered as the first serious attempt to apply a Marxist historian method to
the writing of the Egyptian past, The Development of Capitalism and the Class Struggle in Egypt
by Fu’ad Mursi (1949),  the author portrayed Urabi’s revolt as a revolution which was
“halted”  by  the  forces  of  reaction.  Likewise,  during  the  1919  uprising,  the  diverse
interests of the bourgeoisie and its fear for a Bolshevik-style revolution “postponed” the
socialist revolution, hence, the partial success of the 1919 revolution. Even the royalist
historians as Shafiq Ghurbal started to take interest in revolutionary history of Egypt by
acknowledging the value of revolutions in general and the shortcomings of the 1919 in
particular17. Finally, the same Tawfik al Hakim who in 1933 celebrated the 1919 revolution
in his The Return of the Spirit, starts to acknowledge in 1945 that the achievements of the
revolution were partial and provisional because it lacked a clearly defined social program
18. 
23 Apart from a rediscovery of Urabi’s revolution and the thesis of the partial success of the
1919,  we  observe  a  renewal  of  the  revolutionary  idea  in  these  historical  works.  All
successive Egyptian revolts against the occupation, whether the French in 1798 or the
British one from 1882 until now, are represented as different moments of the same and
constant revolution, which was continuously “halted”, “postponed” or “diverted” from
its right course. The Revolution became the organizing principle of the entire Egyptian
history providing the meaning and explanation to the country’s past as well as the means
of action for its future.
24 How to  explain  such  a  radical  shift  in  historiographical  representation?  It  could  be
explained by political changes that took place after the Second World War. Frustrated
ambitions for Egypt’s independence resulted a in renewal of nationalist movement and
the subsequent radicalization of political life. A number of events marked the period from
1946 until 1952 leading the existing political order, dominated by the King and the Wafd
party, to its symbolic and material fall. The bloody repression of student demonstration
on the bridge Abbas in 1946, the lost war in Palestine in 1948 and the fire of Cairo in
January 1952 were the events that prepared the ground for the coup of Free Officers in
1952. The decline of the existing political order resulted in the need of the alternative
nationalist narrative. It was provided by left-leaning intellectuals fascinated by the Soviet
revolutionary model who diffused new concepts, paradigms and leftist ideological and
revolutionary  passions.  In  a  very  short  span  of  time,  the  revolutionary  imaginary
accompanied by the discourse of corruption of elites and the action of masses replaced
the legalist  and reformist  option that  prevailed up till  then.  The conviction that the
economic exploitation and political colonization were causally related came to prevail
giving birth to the call for a “two stage revolution”, political and social, that would put an
end to both the capitalism and British occupation. The term thawra became ubiquitous
and witnessed a radical transformation of its meaning: while in the past it was perceived
as a set of violent acts, now it came to denote the process of regime change and the
creation of a new political order. To put it differently, it acquired European meaning of
the revolution.
25 Thus, paradoxically, the belief that the existing political order was created by the 1919
uprising became commonplace. As a result, following the loss of the credibility in this
regime, the idea of the “postponement” or “abortion” of the 1919 revolution came to
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prevail. The “failure” of the 1919 was not proclaimed, for the revolution can never fail
because of its continuous nature. Otherwise it can not be considered as the revolution.
26 In this manner, the ideological ground for the coming of the next revolution was already
ready for the military coup led by the Free Officers in July 1952. All the new military
regime  had  to  do  was  to  inscribe  their  coup  d’état  in  the  succession  of  numerous
revolutionary  attempts  by  presenting  their  own action  as  the  final  and  culminating
revolution.  Radically  simplified,  the  national  history  was  reduced to  a  continuum of
revolutionary moments, which, even if unsuccessful, were now celebrated as triumphant
because of the final victory of the 1952. The historical representation that appeared in the
aftermath of the Second World War provided the “1952 revolution” with fundamental
symbolic and ideological “needs” of every revolution, namely the necessity of rupture
and of continuity.
27 First  of  all,  the Free Officers completed the undergoing process of  recovery of  Urabi
revolt by presenting themselves as direct successors of his revolutionary endeavour. As
for the 1919 revolution, it was declared as “the unfinished revolution”. As we have seen,
for the pre-1952 regime,  the rupture meant first  and foremost the emergence of the
national leader Saad Zaghlul and achievements of the Wafd. In order to mark the rupture
with the previous political order, named “the ancient regime”, the architects of the 1952
coup,  discredited the role of  the Wafd.  At the same time,  responding to the need to
inscribe their revolution into continuity, the Free Officers replaced the rupture in the
1919 popular uprising the merit of which was given to the main rivals of the Wafd, the
National Party and its leader Mustapha Kamel. In such a way, the legitimacy and the
revolutionary character of the 1919 uprising were saved.
28 The rupture of the 1952 revolution was marked in a radical and absolute manner. The
mere banishment of the King was perceived as the end of the old order and an already
completed realization of the goals of the new age19.  As Salwa Ismael demonstrated by
deconstructing Nasser’s public discourses,  the detachment of  “now” from “then” was
represented as the movement from the past of dispossession to one of the acquisition.
Furthermore, the whole focus was put on the destruction of the old system rather than
the construction of the new one as expressed in such overused revolutionary slogans of
“destruction of the feudalism” and “ending of political exploitation”20.  Because of the
opposition of the “now” to “then”, the future was reduced to the present which came to
dominate the revolutionary discourse, while the past was harnessed to the purpose of the
present.
29 If the rupture represents a crucial need for every revolution in order to present itself as
the beginning of “the new age”,  the same applies to the principle of continuity.  The
necessity of the continuity stems from the very idea of revolution perceived as a unique
and eternally continuous movement which was repeatedly repressed by enemy forces in
the past. Such a representation of the event provides it with a universal character. Thus,
by presenting themselves as direct successors of the Urabi revolt and the “unfinished”
revolution of 1919, the Free Officers affirmed the continuous and culminating nature of
their revolution,  which,  otherwise,  would lose its universal  and,  hence,  revolutionary
character.
30 It is important, however, to note that such a representation of the past and the present
can not be merely reduced to conscious moves undertaken by the regime in order to
reshape history for its ideological purposes.  The Egyptian case would suggest,  on the
contrary, that these reinterpretations were already underway after the Second World
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War and before the actual change of power and that the newly established regime did no
more  than  to  appropriate,  simplify  and  make  it  official.  The  atmosphere  of  a  tense
revolutionary  anticipation  that  marked  the  aftermath of  the  Second World  War  has
certainly convinced the Free Officers themselves that they were carrying out the genuine
Egyptian revolution. Given this fact, we could suppose that it was in this the pre-coup
period that the rupture took place generating the shared feeling that the old era had
finished although the new one had not arrived yet.
 
Conclusion
31 In the preceding pages, I have endeavoured to show that what is known today as Egyptian
revolutions  of  Ahmad  Urabi  and  of  1919  became  the  revolutions  meaning  historical
ruptures only in the late 40’s when growing discredit of the regime and the search of an
alternative  nationalist  narrative  coincided  with  the  spread  of  a  new  revolutionary
imaginary.  After  the  coup  in  1952,  the  Free  Officers  unified  and  made  official  the
historical vision according to which Egyptian nation was living in a permanent state of
revolution.  Because  of  the  fundamental  needs  of  every  revolution,  the  necessity  of
continuity and that of rupture, the Free Officers were confronted with a dilemma with
regard to the 1919 revolution: how to mark at the same time the continuity with the
revolution and the rupture with the regime created by the revolution? This dilemma was
resolved by the thesis of unfinished revolution.
32 Contemporary  rivalry  between  political  parties  claiming  the  heritage  of  the  two
revolutions is paradoxical. Despite the negative assessment of the 1919 uprising at the
time of its occurring, the Wafd party places the rupture on this moment, thus confirming
the  historical  representation  established  by  the  1952  revolution  with  which  it  now
competes.  This  competition suggests  as  well  that  the  idea  of  unique and permanent
revolution still acts in reading of Egyptian history by maintaining that two “finished”
revolutions  can  not  occur  in  a  country’s  history.  Moreover,  the  existence  of  these
competing narratives confirms the general absence of established meaning of the thawra:
is it the transformation of political and social structures led by the state from above, a
definition found in 1952 revolution, or is it a popular uprising seeking for the change, as
expressed by 1919 revolution? The confusion of these two meanings, thawra as a profound
social and political change, and thawra as a mean of contest, makes the conciliation of the
two revolutions a difficult task.
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ABSTRACTS
L’histoire de l'Égypte moderne est riche en événements « révolutionnaires » : la révolte d’Ahmad
Urabi en 1882, l’insurrection populaire en 1919 et le coup d’Etat des Officiers Libres en 1952. En
étudiant  la  manière  dont  ces  événements  ont  été  perçus  au  moment  de  leur  avènement,  je
propose que leur redéfinition en tant que « révolutions » est un phénomène récent,  lié à des
transformations  déclenchées  après  la  Seconde  Guerre  mondiale.  Le  nouvel  imaginaire
révolutionnaire, qui se diffuse à ce moment sous influence des idées de gauche, est adopté par la
population  en  quête  d’une  nouvelle  idéologie  contestataire  pour  faire  face  au  régime
monarchique en discrédit croissant. C’est en ce moment que s’opère la redéfinition du terme
arabe polysémique al  thawra :  le  sens positif  de « la  révolution » vient à éclipser son sens de
« l’insurrection populaire », lieu d’évaluations négatives au début du XXe siècle. 
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